Introduction
Our aim in this paper is to examine the relative importance of issues and the economy in voting in democratic elections. Most of the focus in our analysis is on two recent Canadian federal elections, with subsequent comparisons to recent elections in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.
There are two basic theoretical premises of our analysis: first, voters reward or punish the incumbent party for macroeconomic conditions; second, voters prefer parties closer to them on the issues. The contribution of our analysis is our development of an explicit methodology which can directly compare the impact of issues with the impact of the economy across elections in a particular nation as well as across nations. Thus, we develop this technique in a way that allows for cross-national comparisions of the effects of economic voting, as well as within-country over-time comparisons of the effect of the economy on elections.
Our twin theoretical premises are obviously based on several long lines of research into democratic elections. First, regarding the impact of economic factors on elections in democratic nations, there is a long literature examining the impact of macroeconomic conditions on elections ---while there is some disagreement in this literature over the specific ways in which macroceonomic conditions shape elections, there is at least a consensus that the macroeconomy does influence electoral outcomes in the aggregate (Alesina and Rosenthal 1994; Alesina and Roubini 1992; Alvarez et al. 1991; Hibbs 1987; Kramer 1971 ; Lewis-Beck 1988; Tufte 1978) . It should come as no surprise that perceptions of macroeconomic conditions held by individual voters, especially perceptions of macroeconomic conditions in the recent past, had been shown to be strong influences on the behavior of these same individual voters (Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1998; Anderson 1995; Fiorina 1981; Kiewiet 1983 ; Lewis-Beck 1988; Powell and Whitten 1993; Paldam 1991) . This research has built upon the foundation first constructed by Key (1966) and Downs (1957) , both of whom were concerned with the distinction between prospective issues, even economic ones, of the sort discussed in early American Voter studies (Campbell et al. 1980) , and retrospective issues. Thus, the literature on the effects of macroeconomics conditions on voting behavior has conceptualized such effects as retrospective economic perceptions, in contrast to prospective economic issue positions (Alvarez 1997, p. 
13).
Regarding our other theoretical premise, that issues also play an important role in explaining voter choices, the literature has been much more mixed; while early literature found that issues did not seem to play a strong role in democratic elections (c.f. Campbell et al. 1964 ), more recent analyses have shown that issues can play powerful roles in elections (Alvarez 1997 ; Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1998; Alvarez, Bowler and Nagler 1998; Carmines and Stimson (1980) ; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1976) ; Page and Brady (1992) ; Pamper (1972) ; Popkin (1991) . Furthermore, in the particular case we will spend most of this paper focused on, studies of Canadian elections have argued that issues matter in Canada for framing support for the parties (Johnston, et al. 1992) . And work on Canadian voters have shown that support for the governing party depends upon voter perceptions of the national economy (Clarke and Stewart 1996) .
Any comparison of the effects of issues and the economy must confront the "race of the variables" problem (King 1986 ). How do we determine which of two variables is "more important?" If a county were to experience an economic event equivalent to the Great Depression, we might expect it to have a large impact on elections. But if such an event is unlikely, then we do not want to ascribe that much power to the economy in determining elections. Similarly, if a party were to adopt issue positions completely outside the mainstream of a polity, we would not want to ascribe too much influence to issues if such a party could not secure many votes. To obtain meaningful comparisons of the effect of issues and the economy we first specify a model of voter behavior that includes the respondents' views of the economy, and the relation between the respondent and the parties on issues. We then estimate this model using the least restrictive statistical model possible. Then we use the estimates from our statistical model to examine the effect of variations in: 1) the respondents' perceptions of the economy; 2) the respondents' views on the issues; and 3) the parties' placements on the issues. By moving these variables over plausible ranges of views of the economy and positions of the issues we can make meaningful and explicit comparisons of the impact of the economy and issues.
We examine two Canadian elections in this paper ---1988 and 1993 --- Then we compare this effect of the economy to estimates derived with similar methodology for the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We show that the effect of the economy varies across elections. In the United States, the economy appears to have been the dominant factor in both the 1992 and 1996 elections. In other countries this appears to be less of a factor, though a significant factor nonetheless.
Model Specification
In a two party system, we could use binary probit or logit to estimate a model of vote choice. In the Canadian multiparty case, we need a method that allows for a polychotomous dependent variable.
Additionally, our issue analyses require a method that allows us to include measures of the characteristics of the alternative vote choices as well as characteristics of the voter. There are a number of statistical techniques which allow us to estimate a model with both of these features (Alvarez and Nagler 1998):
conditional logit, generalized extreme value models, and the multinomial probit model. We argued in previous work that generally the latter two techniques are preferred over conditional logit (and multinomial logit), but that conditional logit is preferred to multinomial logit (Alvarez and Nagler 1998) . In fact, we have shown repeatedly the flexibility and utility of the multinomial probit model for studying multiparty and multicandidate elections (Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1998) . Here we use the multinomial probit model again to produce the estimates we will use to study the impact of economics and issues in Canadian elections, which we will compare to multinomial probit results from three other nations.
We adopt a random utility model framework. We assume that each individual has some level of utility for each party, and the individual votes for the party offering the highest utility. We define the utility of each voter over each of the parties as a function of a systemic component (a riff j+ X i j f3 + E i j ) and a random disturbance (E ij below). So:
where:
uij =vote i's utility for party j.
a;= a vector of characteristics unique to voter i.
Xij =a ve ctor of characteristics unique to party j with respect to voter i.
\Vj and �= vectors of parameters to be estimated .
E ij = a disturbance term.
(1)
After we estimate the parameters of this random utility model using the multinomial probit technique, we can compare the relative effects of issue and economic factors on voter choice in two different ways. We begin by examining the effects of changes in each factor on the likelihood that a hypothetical individual voter would choose each party; we call this the first difference approach. We then examine the effects of issue and economic factors on the overall vote shares of each party, using a counterfactual approach; this involves changing either the party positions on issues or the nature of the macroeconomic situation of a particular election. Armed with both of these techniques (which we detail below in our discussion of the Canadian results in the next sections, and which are explained in more detail in Alvarez To measure the influence of the economy on vote choice, we have two variables. One is a measure of respondents' retrospective evaluations of their own finances. The second measure asks respondents to
give retrospective evaluations of national economic conditions. In both cases, negative evaluations are coded higher.
We also include a set of demographic variables. Because of the continuing debate over the impact of region in Canadian politics, we include four regional variables. Ontario is the omitted category; Atlantic includes Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick; Midwest includes Manitoba and Saskatchewan; West consists of Alberta and British Columbia. For age, we group respondents into four categories (17-29, 30-44, 45-59, 60 and over) and create three dummy variables (60 and over is the omitted category). We also have dummy variables for gender and union affiliation.
Education is measured by respondents years of school grouped into eleven categories. We also include respondents' self reported family income, given in C\10,000 increments. 
Multinomial Probit Results

The 1988 Canadian Election
The coefficient estimates for 1988 are in Table 1 . The coefficients for the 'French' issue and the 'U.S. ties' issue are negative and significant at .10 or better. This is consistent with our expectation that as the voter gets farther from a party on a given issue, he or she is less likely to support that party. And consistent with interpretations of the election and associate campaign, the coefficient for the U.S. ties issue is much larger than the coefficient for the French issue.
[ Table 1 Here]
We report the estimates with the individual specific coefficients normalized to zero for the Progressive Conservatives (PC). This means that the reported coefficients are the impacts of the variables on the utility of each party relative to the PC. The 1988 results for economic conditions suggests that the incumbent PC party was vulnerable to economic performance evaluations. All four economic variable coefficients are significant at the .05 level or better. Positive coefficients mean that voters who perceive poor economic conditions are more likely to choose another party over the incumbents, and voters who perceive favorable economic conditions are more likely to choose the incumbent. Personal finances produces positive and significant estimates. However, the national economy coefficient is particularly large for both parties. In 1988 economic perceptions had a significant impact on vote choice for respondents. But, as we shall see below, the distribution of respondents' economic perceptions was generally positive, which tends to help the incumbent party.
The 1993 Canadian Election
The multinomial probit estimates for 1993 are reported in Table 2 . Of the six issue distances, five coefficients are significant at .05 or better. All of the issue distance coefficients are negative. As we would expect, as the voter gets closer to the party on a given issue, he or she is more likely to support that party, ceteris paribus. And we see variation in the emphasis places on different issues by voters. The coefficients range from -0. 10 (help women) to -0.03 (help business).
[ Table 2 Here]
The results for the economic conditions suggest that the incumbent PC party was particularly hurt by poor economic performance. Of the six economic variable coefficients, three are significant at .05 or better.
All of the six estimated coefficients are positive. Negative economic evaluations (both national and personal) made voters more likely to choose another party over the incumbent PC party.
The PC party was flanked ideologically by the Liberals on the left and Reform on the right. In both cases, economic evaluations had a significant impact on voters' choice of Liberal or Reform over PC. For the Liberal party, the effects of both economic variables are relatively large and positive. Thus voters who viewed the economy, or their own pocketbooks, unfavorably were apt to turn to the Liberal party. In the case of the Reform party, poor national evaluations made voters significantly more likely to choose Reform, and the personal conditions variable is also fairly large and positive, although not significant at standard levels.
Economic conditions seems to have had the least consistent impact on the choice of NDP over PC (one coefficient is large and positive, the other is small and negative). The NDP is the far left party and is the farthest, ideologically, from the PC party. Poor economic conditions seem to have swayed voters away from the incumbent party and toward those parties ideologically close. Table 3 presents first differences computed from the multinomial probit estimates for 1993. These show the impact of a change in a respondents' view of the issues or of economic circumstances in the respondents' probability of supporting any of the four parties. These are computed by first establishing a respondent with modal characteristics: the voter is male, 30-44 years old, non-union, high school educated, living in Ontario with family income of 30,000-39,000. Unless noted, respondent positions on issues are set to the modal category, and economic positions are set to 'same' . All party positions are set at the survey mean. For each variable of interest we compute a set of probabilities with the variable of interest set first at one value, then with the variable of interest set at another value. The difference between these two probabilities is the effect of the change in the variable of interest.
[ Table 3 Here]
The effects of the economy are modest here. A voter who felt his personal finances had gotten worse rather than better was 6% more likely to vote for the Liberal party (.55 vs .50), with most of that vote share being taken from the Progressive Conservatives. A voter who felt the national economy had gotten worse instead of better was 5% more likely to vote for the Liberal party (.55 vs .50). Thus at the individual level the economy has an effect ---but it does not seem overwhelming. This is particularly true if we compare it to a large issue-effect. For instance, a respondent who felt that the government should do more to help minorities rather than less was 12% more likely to vote for the Liberal party (.58 vs .46). Notice in this case though that the votes come at the expense of the Reform party.
Measuring the Relative Importance of Issues and the Economy
Measuring the Importance of Issues
It is true, as Table 3 demonstrates, that a shift in a voter's position on an issue will change the probabilities of that voter choosing a different party. For a party, however, changing issue positions (or forcing the opposition to appear to have moved) may not improve vote share. By improving the party' s position relative to some voters, a party will move farther from other voters. Table 4 shows the distribution of the mean of respondents preferences and the mean of the respondents placement of each party on each issue. Notice that with four parties, the issue space is fairly crowded. To test the effect of strategic behavior by parties, we simulated the effect of a party moving across the issue space, while holding the other parties' positions constant.
[ Table 4 Here] Table 5 . The table also includes the baseline predicted vote share for comparison.
[ Table 5 Here]
The Reform party's predicted vote share in our sample is 29.6% of the vote. At best, moving to the optimal position on one issue (helping women) would bring them up to 33.8%. Notice that this seems like a relatively small increase in vote share given the large impact we saw of respondents' positions on this issue
in the earlier table of first differences. However, in a crowded issue space movement by the Reform party closer to some voters makes other voters more likely to vote for one of the alternative parties. Yet while moving on one issue would not have had an appreciable impact on the election result, moving on all six issues would have. If the Reform party moved to its optimal position on all six issues, it would have received 35% of the vote, and only been 7.8% behind the Liberal party.
Measuring the Importance of the Economy
Now how do examine realistic effects of changes in voter perceptions of the economy? Having data on both 1988 and 1993 makes this apparent, as those two elections were played out under economies perceived to be very different. Table 6 gives the distributions of respondents' perceptions of the economy, both personal finances and the national economy, in 1988 and 1993. We can safely say that in 1988 voters saw the economy as 'good' (over 86% of respondents said the economy was the same or better over the past year); whereas in 1993 voters saw the economy as 'bad' (only 36% of respondents said the economy was the same or better over the past year, and 64% felt it was worse or much worse).
[ [ Tables 7 and 8 Here]
Issues and Economics in a Comparative Context
While the model we have is very general and allows for careful consideration of the factors voters weigh in their vote decision, there is no reason to think that the parameters of the model will be the same across countries. We believe the model is the correct model to estimate for any country. But, since the model does not explicitly incorporate any structural or contextual parameters, we ex p ect the parameters to vary across countries based upon the institutional or party structure of the country and the economic history of the country.
Now we compare the results from Canada to similar analyses for other countries. In other work two of the authors have analyzed the relative impact of issues and the economy on elections in the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands (Alvarez and Nagler 1995 , 1998a , 1998b we are interested in measuring the importance of the economy and issues, we report only the impact of the simulation on the margin between the winning party and the second place party. The first column gives the estimated difference between the first and second place party in our sample. The second column gives the predicted difference between the two parties if peoples' economic perceptions were as they had been in the other election reported from that country. The third column gives the change in the margin between the top two parties based on the hypothetical change in economic perceptions. It is this third column which reports the magnitude of the impact of the economy. The next three columns report the same information for movement by the second place party to its optimal position on all of the issues for which data was available.
[ Table 9 Here]
We can see that for the United States, the effects of the economy are always much larger than the effects of issues. In fact the 1996 election in the United States would have had a different outcome had economic perceptions been as negative as they were in 1992. For Britain in 1987, the effects of issues are larger than the effect of the economy, though neither would have helped the Labour party that year. And for Canada in 1993 the effect of issues are much larger than the effect of the economy, though in 1988 the effect of the economy was larger than that of issues. Thus we see that in fact the relative emphasis placed by voters on the economy and issues does vary across countries, and perhaps across time as well.
Conclusion
Our research in this paper has focused on developing a new way to examine the relative impact of issues and economic perceptions in voting behavior. By producing techniques which allow for direct comparisons of how much each of these factors influences a particular election, we are able to exactly evaluate the relative contributions of each in a number of recent elections in four democratic nations.
While it is clear that issues and economic perceptions have played important roles in shaping voter behavior in these recent elections, we have shown clearly that economic perceptions always exert a strong influence on election outcomes, and often dominate issue considerations. Substantively, this tells us that issue-based theories of electoral politics and economic-based theories of electoral politics need to be refined if they are to encompass the variation in the strength of each explanation that we observer across countries and across time.
But these results have potentially larger significance. While political parties and politicians do have control over their issue positions, it is clear that their ability to freely move across the issue space in search of votes is often limited ---and our research also shows that movement on issues is not always terribly electorally effective, in any case. Many parties simply cannot gain many additional votes by moving in the issue space, and often their moves can spark electoral gains by other parties.
However, the positions parties take on issues are of critical importance in our normative theories of representative democracy. The basic idea is that parties take positions on issues, they are elected to office based on these promises, they act on these issues, and then they are subsequently voted back into office or thrown out based on whether they delivered their promises on these issues. Yet if voters are not placing a great deal of weight on these issues, one of the critical normative underpinnings of representative democracy is weakened.
Instead, voters appear to place much more weight on recent macroeconomic performance; that is, voters are rewarding or punishing parties based on how the national economy performed in the recent past.
Unfortunately, most academic researchers do not believe that political actors have much direct or significant control over the future direction of macroeconomic performance in most advanced industrial democracies --the advanced industrial economies are too complex, and too tightly woven into the global economy, to be easily controlled by political policymakers. Nor are the tools of macroeconomy policy very useful for economic fine-tuning. Thus, voters are rewarding or punishing political parties for outcomes which are largely outside the direct control of the parties. This suggests that political parties once in office will have a great deal of room for shirking, or ignoring the policy preferences of voters. Thus we are faced with a paradox: by paying attention to the most immediate and tangible items of the national news ---the economy ---voters may be letting politicians off the hook for the less newsworthy but ultimately more important functions of government such as the production of public goods.
Issue Distances
French U.S. ties Table entries are the probability of a voter choosing the party where the voter is male, 30-44 years old, non union, high school educated, living in Ontario with family income of $30,000-39,000. Unless noted, respondent positions on issues are set to the modal category, and economic positions are set to 'same' . All party positions are set at the survey mean. The 'difference' row gives the effect of the change in the voter's economic perception or issue position on the probability of choosing each party. Column one is the actual issue position of the party. Column two is the simulated issue position at which the party would received its highest vote share. Columns three through six are the vote shares of the parties at the parties' optimal position. a This is the vote share predicted by the model using the survey respondent mean placement as the party' s issue position.
Respondents view of National Economy
Personal Finances Table entries are the parties' share of the three-party vote the given economic conditions. Simulations are done using MNP estimates. Column entries give the estimates share of the vote if the distribution of respondents preferences were altered to match the 1988 distribution of preferences on the indicated economic question. The Predicted Baseline is the model prediction based on the respondents' actual views of the economy.
